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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The quadrilateral security dialogue, or “Quad,” was reborn in 2017 to secure 
a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Bringing together the US, Japan, 
India, and Australia, the Quad was initially intended as a mechanism for 
responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, it quickly became 
entangled in growing strategic competition across Asia and collapsed in 
2008. Although the four countries still sometimes differ in their views of the 
region’s strategic trends, the Quad’s revival points to a greater alignment 
of interests this time around. Nonetheless, major challenges to the Quad’s 
viability remain. First, it is unclear whether the four powers will be able to 
maximise opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that wider geopolitical 
rivalries do not again overwhelm the grouping. Second, given that it has 
been revived to support this “Indo-Pacific” order, the Quad is constrained by 
the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept and the absence of Indonesia.
2INTRODUCTION
The revised “Quad”—the 2017 update of the informal quadrilateral security 
dialogue originally formed by the US, Japan, India, and Australia in 2007—
represents a renewed attempt to shore up a “rules-based order in the 
Indo-Pacific.”1 Yet the Quad’s resurrection raises more questions than it 
answers. These relate not only to its members’ aims and interests. They also 
touch on questions concerning what the “Indo-Pacific” means as a region, 
why it requires further institutional support, and whether the Quad 2.0 is 
the right institution. This paper begins by outlining the Quad’s background, 
before examining the respective interests of its partners. It then draws out 
the specific areas for likely cooperation and potential obstacles. Finally, 
it concludes with an assessment of the Quad’s prospects. The policy 
brief argues that, while opportunities exist for future low-key cooperation, 
a significant risk is that larger geopolitical rivalries will overwhelm such 
opportunities. Further, as an attempt to support an Indo-Pacific order, the 
Quad is ultimately constrained by the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept 
and the absence of Indonesia. 
1  Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), “Australia-India-Japan-United States 
Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” media release, November 12, 2017, https://dfat.gov.au/news/
media/Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx.
3BACKGROUND AND TRAJECTORY
Quadrilateral cooperation was initially borne out of a natural disaster—the 
Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. One such response was the 
“Tsunami Core Group” established by the US, Japan, Australia, and India to 
facilitate coordination of relief activities. This group was intended to address 
the immediate challenges presented by the tsunami and its aftermath, and 
so was never meant to be permanent.2 But the quadrilateral idea soon 
evolved into something more.3 Japan was keen to establish values-based 
connections in order to create an “arc of freedom and prosperity” through the 
region.4 Accordingly, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum summit held in the Philippines in August 
2007, the four nations met to discuss options for further engagement. Later 
that year, they participated, along with Singapore, in major naval exercises, a 
development which drew criticism from China.5  
However, these early efforts at cooperation immediately raised tensions 
over the Quad’s overarching purpose. By 2008, Australia had expressed 
concerns about the Quad and its impact on Sino-Australian relations and 
had withdrawn from further dialogue “of that nature.”6 India, too, was 
worried about the impact the Quad might have on its own foreign policies.7  
Enthusiasm for the Quad subsequently dissipated, and the idea largely 
disappeared from national diplomacy. Yet the Quad was not dead but merely 
in hiatus. By 2017, a renewed interest in the dialogue had emerged.8 As 
such, the four countries restarted their dialogue, meeting once again in the 
2 Marc Grossman, “The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia 
and Beyond,” Security Challenges 1, no. 1 (2005), 11–14, at 11–12. See also H. D. P. Envall, 
“Community Building in Asia? Trilateral Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief,” in Yuki Tatsumi (ed.), US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges 
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), 51–59, at 53.
3  Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’,” War on the Rocks, November 16, 
2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.
4  Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” speech on 
the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, November 30, 2006, https://
www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.
5  Ramesh Thakur, “Australia and the Quad,” Strategist, July 5, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.
org.au/australia-and-the-quad/. For China’s response, see Brendan Nicholson, “China Warns 
Canberra on Security Pact,” Age, June 15, 2007, https://www.theage.com.au/national/china-
warns-canberra-on-security-pact-20070615-ge54v5.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1.
6  Stephen Smith, “Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign Minister,” February 5, 2008, 
https://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2008/080205_jpc.html. See also Frank Ching, “‘Asian 
Arc’ Doomed without Australia,” Japan Times, February 22, 2008, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
opinion/2008/02/22/commentary/asian-arc-doomed-without-australia/.
7  Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’.”
8  Thakur, “Australia and the Quad.”  
4Philippines, this time on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit. Later, they 
promised to pursue “continuing discussions and deepening cooperation 
based on shared values and principles.”9 The Quad, as Ankit Panda put it, 
was “back.”10 
A CASE OF COINCIDING INTERESTS? 
Euan Graham argues that the future of the new Quad will be shaped 
primarily by the degree to which there is alignment between the four 
partners’ threat perceptions and national interests.11 But what are these 
interests? And do they now coincide? The Quad’s long hiatus shows that 
these interests have not always aligned, with China at the heart of many 
of the Quad’s differences. Indeed, that Australia baulked in 2008 highlights 
China’s growing capacity to shape the strategic choices of countries around 
Asia, leading to doubts amongst the other parties, especially India, over 
Australia’s strategic positioning in the region.12 Still, Australia has not been 
the only Quad partner to have struggled in this respect. In 2009–2010, Japan 
explicitly sought to move closer to Asia, especially China, but its policy 
collapsed with the worsening of Sino-Japanese relations from 2010.13  
Greater alignment exists this time around, although differences persist. 
The US’ grand strategy is confused by the presidency of Donald Trump 
but still exhibits a strong focus on maintaining its regional hegemony and 
resisting China’s rise.14 Japan and India are also seeking to maintain or 
advance their own regional leadership, check Chinese power, and where 
possible hedge between the US and China.15 For Australia, as the Quad’s 
lone middle power, building closer relations with the great powers of the 
Indo-Pacific has long been viewed as an important national interest. Australia 
9 DFAT, “Australia-India-Japan-United States Consultations on the Indo-Pacific.” 
10  Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on 
Regional Cooperation,” Diplomat, November 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-
india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/.
11  Euan Graham, “The Quad Deserves its Second Chance,” in Andrew Carr (ed.), Debating the 
Quad, Centre of Gravity series paper 39 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 
2018), 4–7, at 4.
12  Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’”; Thakur, “Australia and the Quad.”
13  H. D. P. Envall, “Clashing Expectations: Strategic Thinking and Alliance Mismanagement in 
Japan,” in Yoichiro Sato and Tan See Seng (eds.), United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: 
Perspectives from Asia (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2015), 61–88, at 71–72.
14  Louis Nelson, “In Asia, Trump Keeps Talking about Indo-Pacific,” Politico, November 7, 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/07/trump-asia-indo-pacific-244657.
15  H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, “Are India and Japan Potential Members of the Great Power Club?” 
in Joanne Wallis and Andrew Carr (eds.), Asia-Pacific Security: An Introduction (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 63–81, esp. 68–69, 73–75.  
5sees that traditional alliances (i.e. those led by the US) might be usefully 
supplanted by minilateral arrangements to extend shared norms and rules 
around the region.16 In this respect, the Quad reflects the wider proliferation 
of strategic partnerships across Asia.17 
In fact, what divided the four powers in 2007–2008—China’s rise—is 
arguably now bringing them closer together. This was not a recent shift 
but has been apparent since 2010.18 It became even more obvious in 2012 
when Xi Jinping assumed power in China. Xi began dismantling the “hide 
your strength, bide your time” strategy, moving instead toward a “community 
of common destiny.”19 China’s growing assertiveness has challenged the 
regional order across a range of issues, including territorial disputes (e.g. in 
the South China Sea) and economic relationships (as a result of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative).20 For Japan, India, and Australia there is also the issue 
of how to keep the US in the region despite Trump’s “America First” agenda. 
The new Quad thus holds out the promise of achieving enmeshment as well 
as balancing objectives. 
The four partners’ common interest in a “rules-based” order is clear 
(notwithstanding the complications of “America First”). In recent years, Japan 
has been especially active in making this case, such as by promoting the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP11). In 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe envisaged a 
“democratic security diamond” that would help “safeguard the maritime 
commons stretching from the Indian ocean region to the western Pacific.”21 
In 2016, while meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Abe argued that 
16  See William T. Tow and H. D. P. Envall, “Australia Debates American Primacy in Asia,” in Sato 
and Seng (eds.), United States Engagement in the Asia-Pacific, 297–323, at 313; William T. 
Tow and H. D. P. Envall, “The US and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: 
Can Convergent Security Work?” IFANS Review 19, no. 2 (2011), 49–72, at 51–52.
17  H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, “Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional Security 
Governance,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016), 87–105, at 88–89.
18  H. D. P. Envall, “Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally,” in Michael Wesley (ed.), Global 
Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 15–30, at 
27–28.
19  See Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for 
Washington and Its Allies,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (2018), https://tnsr.org/2018/12/
xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/.
20  “China Has Militarised the South China Sea and Got Away with It,” Economist, June 21, 2018, 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/06/21/china-has-militarised-the-south-china-sea-and-got-
away-with-it. On the prospects for an integrated Chinese-led order, see Nick Bisley, Integrated 
Asia: Australia’s Dangerous New Strategic Geography, Centre of Gravity series paper 31 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2017).
21 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo- 
abe#5R2zcYPpL6wLTzTF.99.  
6a “free and open Indo-Pacific” was “vital to achieving prosperity in the entire 
region.”22  Abe has also pushed to reform Japan itself, especially in the 
security realm.23
COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES OR OBSTACLES?
Can the Quad meet its partners’ interests in practical ways? Quad 
cooperation could take two basic forms: a narrow functional approach or 
a broader regional approach. Greater functional cooperation might cover 
working jointly to deal with region-wide disasters through a combined 
disaster relief policy.24 A broader regional approach, by comparison, might 
bring in new actors to address major topics of regional concern, such as 
the issue of maritime accidents. Either way, as Ian Hall suggests, the Quad 
needs to be better at communicating core objectives, coordinating policy 
efficiently, developing an agenda that is more focused, and diversifying the 
arrangement beyond the current membership.25 
Greater functional cooperation could cover deeper forms of capacity-
building in incremental rather than radical ways. Cooperation on military 
readiness, such as through joint military training, offers a low-key alternative 
to grand announcements regarding mutual defence pacts, although it 
may still antagonise China. Establishing the Malabar exercises as a Quad 
undertaking, thereby bringing Australia back into these exercises, would 
constitute a shift toward such cooperation.26 Wider defence cooperation, 
particularly in terms of sharing military technologies or establishing 
procedures for greater intelligence sharing, may also be possible. Indeed, 
Japan has already undertaken substantial reforms in recent years to extend 
its intelligence-sharing cooperation.27  
22  Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-India Joint Statement,” November 11, 2016, 1, https://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000202950.pdf. 
23  H. D. P. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’: Japan’s New Regional Realism,” International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific (2018), 1–29, doi: 10.1093/irap/lcy014.
24  Kate Stevenson and H. D. P. Envall, “The ‘Quad’ and Disaster Management: An Australian 
Perspective,” in Yuki Tatsumi and Jason Li (eds.), International Disaster Response: Rebuilding 
the Quad? (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2019),13–23.
25  Ian Hall, “Advancing the Quad through Diversification,” Lowy Interpreter, November 30, 2017, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/advancing-quad-through-diversification. See also Ian 
Hall, “Meeting the Challenge: The Case for the Quad,” in Carr (ed.), Debating the Quad, 12–15; 
H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, “Strategic Partnerships: Helping or Hindering Security?” East Asia 
Forum, June 15, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-
or-hindering-security/.
26 Thakur, “Australia and the Quad.”
27 Tsukasa Hadano, “Japan Lends its Vision to ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence Alliance,” Nikkei Asian 
7Review, January 10, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Japan-lends-its-
vision-to-Five-Eyes-intelligence-alliance. See also H. D. P. Envall, “Japan’s ‘Pivot’ Perspective: 
Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance,” Security Challenges 12, no. 3 (2016), 5–19, at 13.
28 “US-backed ‘Quad’ Quietly Gains Steam as Way to Balance China,” Straits Times, November 
15, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/us-backed-quad-quietly-gains-steam-as-
way-to-balance-china.
29  Biswajit Dhar, “India’s Free Trade Woes,” East Asia Forum, October 9, 2018, http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/09/indias-free-trade-woes/.
30 Jeff M. Smith, “India and the Quad: Weak Link or Keystone?” Strategist, January 15, 2019, 
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-the-quad-weak-link-or-keystone/.  
31  See Rory Medcalf, “An Indo-Pacific Quad is the Right Response to Beijing,” Australian Financial 
Review, November 8, 2017, https://www.afr.com/news/economy/an-indopacific-quad-is-the-
right-response-to-beijing-20171108-gzh3c7; Hugh White, “Why the US is No Match for China in 
Asia, and Trump Should Have Stayed at Home and Played Golf,” South China Morning Post, 
November 15, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2120010/why-us-no-
match-china-asia-and-trump-should-have-stayed-home; Hugh White, “The Indo-Pacific: Talking 
About It Doesn’t Make It Real,” Strategist, November 22, 2016, https://www.aspistrategist.org.
au/indo-pacific-talking-doesnt-make-real/.
A major challenge for broader cooperation remains finding practical ways 
to deploy the Quad to support the regional order. Again, the risk is that this 
would trigger accusations of containment. Already, the Quad is moving to 
cooperate on supporting regional infrastructure projects.28 The focus here 
should be on finding projects that better integrate the Indo-Pacific as a 
coherent maritime regional order. A more ambitious order-building endeavour 
would be to use the Quad to push for a more sophisticated Indo-Pacific 
investment and trading order. This would require the Quad partners to 
engage with other regional entities, such as the TPP11. Inevitably, there are 
complicating factors here too. Trump’s apparent preference for trade wars (or 
the threat of such wars) is fundamentally opposed to such a vision. Likewise, 
India is also a reluctant trade liberaliser.29
US and India’s approaches to global trade policy offer an insight into the 
difficulties involved in deepening Quad cooperation. The resulting ambiguity 
about their outlook and role in the Quad reduces the scope for meaningful 
cooperation. Externally, Chinese criticism that the Quad represents 
encirclement and “Cold War thinking” continues to shape arguments about 
the Quad’s value. Australia’s decision to withdraw from the Quad in 2008 
continues to raise questions, particularly from India, as to whether Australia 
is “potentially compromised by Chinese influence.”30 Yet India’s commitment 
to the Quad is complicated by its relationship with China and attachment 
to non-alignment. However, the contention that the Quad will trigger a 
security dilemma and subsequent arms racing scenario becomes ever less 
persuasive: increasingly, the Quad can be seen not as a trigger but as a 
response to China’s growing assertiveness.31 
832  Andrew O’Neil and Lucy West, “Why the Quad Won’t Ever Be an Asian NATO,” Strategist, 
January 24, 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-quad-wont-ever-be-an-asian-nato/.
33  See Benjamin Zala, “Taking the Potential Costs of the Quad Seriously,” in Carr (ed.), Debating 
the Quad, 19–22, at 19–20.
34  Ibid., 20.
35  Stevenson and Envall, “The ‘Quad’ and Disaster Management,” 17.
36  See Nick Bisley, “Is there a Problem with … the Quad?” China Matters, July 2018, http://
chinamatters.org.au/public-outreach/policy-brief-july/.  
Beyond these obstacles there are deeper questions for the Quad. 
What exactly does it mean to be an Indo-Pacific forum? How would the 
Quad engage with established regional institutions, such as ASEAN? And 
how might it better link the “Indo” with the “Pacific”? That such questions 
generate controversy is already apparent in the Australian debate. Here, 
Quad believers tend to see the Indo-Pacific as a coherent strategic construct 
while Quad sceptics dispute this. For example, Quad believer Rory Medcalf 
contends that the Quad offers a way to manage the uncertainties of regional 
rivalries by embedding them in the Indo-Pacific region, while Quad sceptic 
Hugh White not only views the Quad as an “empty gesture masquerading 
as a policy” but also disputes the coherence of the Indo-Pacific as a single 
international system.  
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
What are the Quad’s prospects? The immediate challenge is one of aims. 
A persistent criticism of the Quad is that it lacks a common purpose or 
substantive agenda.32 Further, amongst all the objectives cited as reasons 
for bringing the four states together, none are exclusive to the Quad. Other 
actors and institutions already exist in the region for these purposes (e.g. 
ASEAN-based bodies). The Quad partners need to better articulate their own 
unique rationale for cooperation.33  
So far, however, the four states have created a context whereby the 
possible benefits of the Quad are vague, but the costs obvious. As Benjamin 
Zala argues, seeking to constrain Chinese power “is an extremely important 
downside.”34 Indeed, the lingering sense of strategic containment may 
easily hamper low-key initiatives—improved disaster policy coordination, for 
instance, might by stymied by controversies associated with Sino-American 
rivalry.35  
Yet the strategic perceptions surrounding the Quad’s purported balancing 
role may now be unavoidable. This raises doubts on benefits of welcoming 
Chinese engagement with the Quad.36 It also suggests that the Quad’s 
937  Graham, “The Quad Deserves its Second Chance,” 5. See also Bisley, Integrated Asia, 3.
38  Graham, “The Quad Deserves its Second Chance,” 6.
39 Shafiah F. Muhibat and M. Habib Abiyan Dzakwan, “Indonesia and the Quad: Can’t or Won’t 
Decide?” Strategist, December 7, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesia-and-the-
quad-cant-or-wont-decide/. 
prospects will be shaped most by the logic (or lack thereof) of an emerging 
Indo-Pacific strategic geography. If the Indo-Pacific concept has any strategic 
value, it is to be found especially in the idea that a more integrated maritime 
geopolitical complex is emerging—one that links the US, China, and India 
across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.37 If these linkages prove to be 
important, the Quad might conceivably help with their institutionalisation. 
Geopolitically, the crucial juncture between the Indo and Pacific sub-
regions is maritime Southeast Asia and, especially, Indonesia. Indonesia is 
adjacent both to the region’s most complex maritime territorial dispute and 
to its major shipping routes. It is also democratic, a rising power, and has 
an uncertain relationship with China. As a new piece of the Indo-Pacific 
strategic architecture, the revised dialogue might be boosted if it swapped its 
“quadrilateral” format for a “pentagonal” one. Yet Indonesia is largely absent 
from debates about the Quad.38 This may be due to its own ambivalence 
regarding the grouping, preference for non-alignment, or ambition to maintain 
at least a cordial relationship with China.39 At present, Indonesia’s absence 
reinforces both the Quad’s underdeveloped status and the persistent doubts 
as to whether the Indo-Pacific is in fact a single, coherent region. As it 
stands, the Quad remains an idea whose time is yet to come. 
10
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
H. D. P. (David) Envall is a Fellow / Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
International Relations at The Australian National University. David received 
his BA (Hons) and PhD from the University of Melbourne, Australia, and 
his MA from Hitotsubashi University, Japan. In addition to having worked 
as a copy editor and corporate editor/writer, he has taught on Japan’s 
international relations at Tokyo International University and on politics and 
Asian studies at La Trobe University, Australia. His research interests include 
Japanese foreign and security policy and security in the Indo-Pacific. 
11
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC 
STUDIES 
The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is a key research 
component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It 
focuses on defence and security research to serve national needs. IDSS 
faculty and research staff conducts both academic and policy-oriented 
research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast 
Asia and the Asia Pacific.
IDSS is divided into three research clusters: (i) The Asia Pacific cluster – 
comprising the China, South Asia, United States, and Regional Security 
Architecture programmes; (ii) The Malay Archipelago cluster – comprising 
the Indonesia and Malaysia programmes; and (iii) The Military and Security 
cluster – comprising the Military Transformations, Maritime Security, and 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) programmes. Finally, 
the Military Studies Programme, the wing that provides military education, is 
also a part of IDSS.
  
For more information about IDSS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss.
ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a think tank 
and professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore. An autonomous school, RSIS’ mission 
is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and 
international affairs in the Asia Pacific. With the core functions of research, 
graduate education and networking, it produces cutting-edge research on 
Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-
traditional Security, Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Terrorism Studies. 
 
For more details, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg. Follow us at www.facebook.
com/RSIS.NTU or connect with us at www.linkedin.com/school/rsis-ntu.
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg
